The concept of a European
Introduction
On the 25 th of October 2012, the European Parliament adopted Directive 2012/29/EU establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime ('the Directive'). It aims to do exactly what its title reads and offers even greater protection to special victims, such as children and victims of sexual violence. However, a specific provision -Section 24, paragraph 1a -might give rise to some debate. It reads:
'In addition to the measures provided for in Article 23, Member States shall ensure that where the victim is a child: (a) in criminal investigations, all interviews with the child victim may be audiovisually recorded and such recorded interviews may be used as evidence in criminal proceedings '. (Note 1) This provision aims at protecting children from reliving past trauma, possibly by encountering their sexual assaulter, but might infringe on one of the European Union's ('EU') basic fundamental rights: the right to a fair trial. Namely, Section 6, paragraph 3d of the European Convention on Human Rights ('ECHR' or 'European Convention') gives anyone charged with a criminal offense the right to obtain the attendance of witnesses in court. As a result, the maxim summum ius, summa iniuria -freely translated, 'the greatest right causes the greatest injustice' -might very well apply to the situation before us. Currently, the EU is in the process of acceding to the Council of Europe, which will subject European provisions to the legal norms of the ECHR. This development, as a result, gives the ECHR a significant place in this research.
The fact that these legal provisions might be incompatible with each other gives rise to uncertainty; hence the principle of legitimate expectation might not be followed correctly. It is therefore of the utmost importance to investigate whether there is indeed a conflict between these two legal provisions and why. Consequently, this research focusses on answering the following question:
Is the right to protection of child victims who are witnesses in criminal proceedings, as secured by Directive 2012/29/EU, compatible with the right to fair trial of suspects under the European Convention on Human Rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights?

Method
In discovering which developments and legal provisions preceded the Directive, three UN General Assembly resolutions are analysed as several literary sources referred to them as important international developments leading to the adoption of the Directive. Relevant Council of Europe legislation and recommendations are used as well since this organisation continues to have a strong influence on the creation of EU law. Lastly, an EU Framework Decision on victim protection and several reports from the European Commission on this topic are considered as they give a clear image of EU legislation before the adoption of the Directive.
In providing a clear answer to the research question, the provisions of the Directive are thoroughly analysed. Occasionally, provisions of directives can be invoked directly before national courts. Therefore, relevant European Court of Justice ('ECJ') case law is discussed. Additionally, as the Directive replaces Council Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings, the ECJ case law relating to this Framework Decision, such as Pupino, is analysed as well. These cases provide insight about the scope of the right to fair trial under the Framework Decision.
In determining the compatibility of the Directive with the European Charter of Fundamental Rights ('Charter') literature is used to establishing the scope of the Charter. ECJ case law, which refers to EU general principles, and explanation papers relating to the Charter are included to assess the compatibility of this Directive with the Charter.
European Norms on Victims of Crime
After nearly a decade of debate and discussion, the Council of Europe included in 1983 the content of a resolution on victim compensation in the European Convention on the Compensation of Victims of Violent Crimes. (Note 10) The Convention underlined the need for developing victim compensation schemes 'by the State in whose territory (…) crimes were committed (Note 11) and provides minimum provisions to achieve its objectives. Although this Convention did not pursue compensation for all types of victims, the Council of Europe was labelled 'a pioneer' in regulating the needs of victims. (Note 12) The resolution that led to the establishment of this Convention brought to light large differences between some Members States in the treatment of non-citizens and the lack victim protection in general in other Member States. The EU's main incentive to protect victims on a supranational level were the numerous problems relating to cross-border or foreign victims. However, the EU never intended to provide foreign victims with more rights and protection than domestic victims. For this reason, the Framework Decision applied to all victims of crime. Groenhuijsen and Pemberton stated that it differed from existing international instruments due to the different criminal law systems in the Member States. (Note 25) The Framework Decision does take into account these different systems, but it was expected that major changes in the national criminal proceeding laws of the Member States were required to meet the obligations under the Framework Decision. (Note 26) In the years that followed, the European Commission received national reports concerning the implementation of these reports. (Note 27) Most Member States claimed to fulfil their obligations, but the Commission did not share this view. (Note 28) Accordingly, the Commission presented an overview of the shortcomings of the chosen approaches by the Member States. (Note 29) Allegedly, the vague and widely-interpretable standards of the Framework Decision made it hard to assess whether the Member States complied with its obligations. As a result, it is difficult to determine whether this Union instrument has led to the desired and required minimum harmonisation in the field of victim protection. for the Union as whole had contributed to the adoption of the Directive, which is larger in size and contains detailed rights entitled to victims of crimes. This detailed character of the Directive leaves little room for discretion and interpretation, as was the case with the Framework Decision. It is now to the Member States to implement the objectives of the Directive in order to achieve minimum harmonisation on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime.
Conclusion
Which developments and legal provisions preceded the final draft of the Directive must be established in light of the internationalised attention for the position of victims of crimes. From the 1980s onward, different soft law instruments have been adopted to ensure victims compensation. Although the content of these measures was quite similar, measures taken by the EU have had a binding character. The widely-interpretable obligations of the Framework Decision have been replaced by the Directive's detailed rules. This can certainly affect the by the EU desired minimum harmonisation of this matter on the European level.
Protection of Child Victims Who Are Witnesses in Criminal Proceedings under the Directive
Introduction
The Directive was adopted in light of the described developments with regard to victim protection in the EU, thereby replacing the Framework Decision on the standing of victims in criminal proceedings. The Directive recognises that European citizens falling victim to crime, especially those who are particularly vulnerable, such as children, should be able to rely on minimum standards recognised throughout the Union. (Note 36) At the same time, protecting the right to fair trial of the suspect cannot be disregarded. This chapter examines how the Directive protects child victims who are witnesses in criminal proceedings and how it takes into account the right to fair trial of suspects.
First, the rights of child victims who are witnesses as laid down in the Directive are discussed. Second, the status of the Directive provisions in national legal orders is examined. Where children can invoke the Directive provisions before national courts through direct effect, the threat to the right to fair trial of the suspect might be more immediate. Third, the interpretation of the ECJ of the scope of victim rights, including those of children, as recognised by the Framework Decision is analysed. Fourth, it is discussed how the Directive takes into account the right to fair trial of suspects and which provisions of the Directive may be incompatible with the right to fair trial.
The Provisions of the Directive
The Directive recognises that special victims may need specific protection. It states that Member States shall ensure that measures are available to protect victims from secondary victimisation, especially by protecting their dignity during questioning and when testifying. (Note 37) Child victims are likely to experience a high rate of secondary victimisation due to their vulnerability. (Note 38) Therefore, the Directive presumes that child victims need specific protection. (Note 39) Where the victim is a child, the child's best interests shall be a primary consideration and shall, moreover, be assessed on an individual basis. (Note 40) It follows from these considerations that Member States are required to ensure that child victims who are witnesses in criminal proceedings receive an individual assessment to identify specific protection needs and to determine whether they would benefit from the special measures under Articles 23 and 24 of the Directive. Article 24 provides for an additional set of available measures for child victims. With regard to child victims who are witnesses, Member States are obliged to guarantee that all interviews with the child victim may be audiovisually recorded and that such recorded interviews may be used as evidence in criminal proceedings. (Note 45) It is for the Member States to determine procedural rules for these recordings.
Status of Directive Provisions in National Legal Orders
The adoption of the Directive replaced the Framework Decision. The preamble of the Directive states its intention to amend and expand the provisions of the Framework Decision. (Note 46) This is an interesting observation, not only with regard to the scope of victim protection, but also with regard to the question whether individuals can rely on the provisions of the Directive before national courts.
Since the Lisbon Treaty entered into force, the EU's regulating competences in criminal matters have increased in number. Under European Community law, criminal law was part of the Third Pillar and regulatory initiatives by the EU thus remained limited to adopting framework decisions. (Note 47) The ECJ assumed jurisdiction over these framework decisions only in relation to the obligation of Member States to interpret national law in light of these framework decisions. (Note 48) The Lisbon Treaty, however, provided the Union with the competence to adopt legal instruments of the former First Pillar in certain fields of criminal law in order to facilitate mutual recognition of judgments and judicial decisions and police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters with a cross-border dimension. With regard to the rights of victims, the Union is competent to establish minimum rules by means of directives. (Note 49) As is well known, provisions of directives might have direct effect, meaning that individuals can invoke them before national courts. Since it was not possible for victims to invoke the provisions of the Framework Decision, it is interesting to analyse whether this is the case for the provisions of the Directive. As famously stated by the ECJ, provisions of Directives may have direct effect:
herever the provisions of a directive appear, as far as their subject-matter is concerned, to be unconditional and sufficiently precise, those provisions may (…) be relied upon as against any national provision which is incompatible with the directive or in so far as the provisions define rights which individuals are able to assert against the State.' (Note 50)
In principle, (Note 51) directive provisions can only have direct effect after the period for transposition into national law has expired. (Note 52) Whether a directive provision is sufficiently precise is determined by its wording. The unconditional character of a provision deals with the question whether implementation measures are still required for the provision to achieve its objectives. (Note 53)
Although the direct effect of provisions of the Directive might vary from case to case (Note 54), it should be noted that the preamble provides a strong indication of their possible applicability. Namely, it states that the Directive 'confers rights on victims of extra-territorial offences only in relation to criminal proceedings that take place in the Union.' (Note 55)
The wording of the provisions applicable to the protection of child victims who are witnesses confirms the specific nature of the rights laid down in the Directive. This notion is confirmed when compared to the wording of the Framework Decision, which requires Member States, rather inexplicitly, to ensure that vulnerable victims are entitled to testify in a manner which protects victims from the effects of giving testimony in open court. (Note 56) For example, Article 24 states that Member States have to ensure that where the victim is a child all interviews may be recorded and may be used as evidence. It seems probable to assume that a child who has been summoned to testify in court may directly rely on its right to be audiovisually recorded outside the court. Resultantly, this might affect the right to fair trial of the suspect in cases where national authorities previously had discretion to determine in which way testimony of the child victim had to be taken.
The European Court of Justice on Victim Rights
As stated above, its preamble specifically states that the Directive means to amend and expand the provisions of the Framework Decision. (Note 57) Therefore, it is interesting to analyse ECJ case law relating to the Framework Decision as it gives a clear image of its stance towards victim rights, particularly concerning child victims who are witnesses.
Pupino is the first case in which a national court referred to the ECJ to give an interpretation of the Framework Decision. An Italian teacher was accused of maltreating a number of five-year-old children. The public prosecutor asked the referring court whether it could take the testimony of the child victims at the pre-trial stage in order to protect them from examination at the trial stage. Italian law provided this protection only to child victims in sexual abuse cases. The referring court, therefore, asked the ECJ whether, in light of the Framework Decision, this procedure should also be available for child victims of other crimes, such as maltreatment.
The ECJ stressed that child victims of maltreatment, given their age and the nature and consequences of the alleged offences, classify as particular vulnerable victims. (Note 58) These victims should thus be able 'to use a special procedure, (…), if that procedure best corresponds to the situation of those victims and is necessary in order to prevent the loss of evidence, to reduce the repetition of questioning to a minimum, and to prevent the damaging consequences, for those victims, of their giving testimony at the trial.' (Note 59) However, the Framework Decision must be interpreted with respect for fundamental rights, including the right to fair trial as established in Article 6 ECHR. (Note 60) Therefore, it should be ensured that the proceedings as a whole remain fair for the suspect. (Note 61) More specifically, the ECJ ruled in the Katz case that Article 6(3)(d) www.ccsenet.org/jpl Journal of Politics and Law Vol. 6, No. 4; 2013 ECHR, which ensures the right for the defendant to examine or have examined witnesses, also applies to the testimony of the victim. (Note 62) As a general rule, the ECJ ruled that the Framework Decision requires the Member States to recognise that victims enjoy a high level of protection and have an appropriate role in the criminal legal system. (Note 63) Accordingly, its provisions imply that the victim should be able to give a testimony which can be used as evidence. (Note 64) However, the Framework Decision must be interpreted as leaving wide discretion to the national authorities as to how to achieve its objectives. Member States are not obliged to treat victims and suspects in an equivalent manner.
(Note 65) In the X case, the ECJ ruled that the Framework Decision does not preclude rules that do not impose an obligation on the national authorities to offer particularly vulnerable victims the possibility to be heard and give evidence under specific protective arrangements during criminal investigations. (Note 66)
Right to Fair Trial of Suspects under the Directive
It is clear that the Directive intends to offer strong protection to child victims who are witnesses in criminal proceedings. Notwithstanding the importance of such protection, the right to fair trial for the suspect should not be disregarded. The question that lies before us is how to balance the right to fair trial and child victim protection. Particularly, the provision which allows all recorded interviews to be used as evidence raises questions with regard to the right of the suspect to examine witnesses. This section analyses the relation between the rights of child victims who are witness and the rights to fair trial of suspects within the scope of the Directive.
The preamble clearly states that the rights set out in the Directive are without prejudice to the rights of the offender. The term 'offender' refers both to persons convicted and suspected of a crime. More specifically, this primacy of fair trial means that real-time video conferencing is the preferable method to balance the protection of the witness and the right to examine the witness. (Note 73) Video recording the interviews may be an alternative provided that the inability for the suspect to examine the victim as a witness is sufficiently counterbalanced with safeguards in favour of the suspect. (Note 74) In contrast, Article 24 of the Directive states that where the victim is a child interviews may be audio-recorded and be used as evidence. (Note 75) Considering this wording, it is at least questionable whether or not this provision requires counterbalancing factors. Therefore, its compatibility with the right to fair trial may be questioned, especially given the possibility that children might be able to rely on Article 24 directly before a national court
Conclusion
It can be concluded that the Directive intends to provide extensive protection to child victims who are witnesses in criminal proceedings. The scope of the Directive is considerably wider than that of the Framework Decision, especially considering the possible direct effect of its provisions. It appears that the rights of child victims who are witnesses as laid down in the Directive have been expanded significantly compared to the ECJ's interpretation of the Framework Decision provisions. The rights of child victims are, however, without prejudice to the rights of the suspect. Specifically, it is questionable whether Article 24 is ultimately compatible with the right to fair trial. To further investigate this notion, it is necessary to examine its compatibility with the right to fair trial as laid down in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights.
The Directive in Light of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
Introduction
Although initially fundamental rights were not included in the institutional nature of the predecessors of the EU, its institutions developed these rights over time. For the scope of this study it is of importance to assess whether the Directive, with its specific provisions concerning the protection of child victims, as laid down in section 24 of the Directive, is compatible with the Charter.
The Compatibility of the Directive with the Charter
As said before, the Charter offers equal or higher standards of protection than the ECHR. In the only relevant case that exists in relation to Section 47, and then in particular concerning the 'fair trial' part of this Section, the ECJ had said that 'the right to a fair trial, which derives inter alia from Article 6 of the ECHR, constitutes a fundamental right which the EU respects as a general principle under Article 6(2) EU'. (Note 100) It appears from the case law of the ECJ that the fundamental rights that are offered in the ECHR have a 'special significance' in the legal order of the Union and are an integral part of the general principles of the Union. (Note 101) Maduro concluded in his opinion that the ECJ 'is required to take into account the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights when interpreting the fundamental rights'. (Note 102)
As a consequence of the reference, whether or not explicitly, that is made by the ECJ, the Charter itself and the Treaty on the European Union, to the case law of the ECHR, the question whether Section 24 of the Directive is compatible with the Charter, must be answered in light of the case law of the ECHR, taking into account the safeguards that thereby were provided.
Conclusion
Although fundamental rights received the status of primary Union law, the establishment of the Charter does not imply that the 'ECJ has become 'a second European Court on Human Rights''. (Note 103) The Charter provides a binding guideline for the Union institutions and Member States in the interpretation of the guaranteed rights.
Interpreting these freedoms in light of the ECHR, as laid down in the Charter, is a codification of the ECJ settled case law. This means that the compatibility of the right to fair trial and the right of defence with the Directive must be assessed in light of the ECHR case law.
Participation of Child Victims in Criminal Proceedings and Fair Trial under the European Convention on Human Rights
Introduction
The Directive obliges states to allow audio-recorded testimonies by children as evidence in criminal cases. As stated before, this might contradict the right to fair trial, a right that has been recognised by a variety of legal documents. (Note 104) Citizens of Member States to the ECHR have direct access to the ECtHR and all EU Member States have ratified the ECHR. Thus, all people affected by the Directive can also rely on the ECHR. A subsequent violation of the right to fair trial as a result of the use of invalid evidence could therefore constitute for a discrepancy between ECHR case law and the Directive.
It is therefore paramount to investigate how the ECHR and ECtHR case law protect the right to fair trial in relation to the participation of child victims in criminal proceedings.
Relevant Provisions of the European Convention
The Right to Fair Trial
The right to fair trial is guaranteed under Article 6 of the European Convention and provides everyone with the right to a fair trial. (Note 105) This right includes several other rights, including the right to cross-examine witnesses, which is safeguarded under Article 6(3)(d). (Note 106) In principle, witnesses should thus attend a hearing in order to have their testimony considered in court.
Victims' Rights to Participate in Criminal Proceedings
The European Convention protects the rights of all people, including victims and witnesses, within its scope. For instance, it protects the right to life (Article 2), the right to private life (Article 8), and the freedom of expression (Article 10). These rights could be applicable to victims whose audio-recorded testimonies; however, the European Convention does not explicitly guarantee child victims' right to participate in criminal cases. (Note 107)
Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights
Interests of the Suspect v. Interests of the Witness
As stated before, the European Convention states that witnesses should be present at trial for them to be cross-examined by the defendant. While no exception is given in the Convention, ECtHR case law does provide exceptions to this rule. This was first recognised in the Doorson case. (Note 108)
Hereafter, it also made clear that the ECtHR does recognise the interests of witnesses, but acknowledges that a deviation from Article 6 ECHR would create a handicap for the defence. Hence, it states, procedures taken by judicial authorities should, in this case, counterbalance the defence's handicap. (Note 109)
Counterbalancing Factors
The previous paragraph showed that the ECtHR does recognise the interests of witnesses. As this research focusses on child victims, this paragraph will outline the counterbalancing factors that give these child victims the opportunity to have their testimonies audio-recorded outside of the courtroom and used as evidence.
In P.S. v. Germany (Note 110), the defendant was accused of having sexually abused an eight-year-old girl. As the District Court believed that the girl might relive her trauma if questioned at trial, it relied solely on evidence obtained from a short police interview with the girl and a statement of the mother, to whom the girl had spoken to right after the incident. In appeal the Regional Court, however, believed that the District Court's reasons for declining the defendant's request for an expert opinion were too vague and, subsequently, hired an expert to assess the girl's reliability. (Note 111) The ECtHR, nevertheless, found a violation of the defendant's right to fair trial as, first, there had been a delay of 18 months between the alleged event in question and the preparation of the opinion; second, the evidence provided by the girl was reported in court by third persons, and; third, the girl's testimony was the only evidence available.
(Note 112)
In the S.N. case (Note 113) the defendant was accused by a ten-year-old boy, who testified twice to the police that he had been abused. The child was not examined in court; however, the counsel of the defendant was invited to both testimonies, of which the first was video-recorded and the second audio-recorded. The interviews with the child were conducted by a police officer with long-standing experience in child abuse cases and, while the counsel of the defendant had agreed not to be present at the interview, it did collaborate with the police in determining which aspects the interview would focus on. The counsel was also given opportunity to put questions to the child, but refrained from doing so. The interviews were shown during trial. (Note 114)
While the Court acknowledged that the defendant did not have the opportunity to exercise his rights fully, it believed that the high standards that are required to counterbalance the absence of a witness were met by the above-mentioned conditions. Hence, no violation of Article 6(3)(d) was established. (Note 115)
In contrast to S.N., the ECtHR did find a violation of the right to fair trial in the Bocos Cuesta case. (Note 116) In this case, four children had testified to the police that they had been sexually assaulted by the defendant, who was subsequently convicted. The defence's request to have the witnesses heard in court was denied by the Dutch Court of Appeals as it believed that the possible trauma the children would suffer weighed more heavily than the defendant's interest in hearing the children in court. The Court of Appeals found the testimonies reliable as they were highly similar, the witnesses had recognised the defendant, the police offers who questioned the children were highly experienced in child abuse cases and posed open-ended questions, and the testimonies were taken individually and corroborated each other. (Note 117) The ECtHR disagreed with the Dutch Court of Appeal and found the proceedings unfair as the witness testimony was the only evidence in the case. Also, it was not firmly established that the children would relive trauma if faced with the defendant in court. Here, an expert opinion could have made a difference. Furthermore, the children's statements were not recorded on tape and, as a result, the judges were not able to observe the actual statements, but, rather, an interpretation of them. In contrast to Bocos Cuesta, the child victim's testimony in the A.L. case (Note 120) was recorded and shown in court, which allowed the defendant and the judge to, at least to some degree, assess the credibility of the child. The defendant was also allowed to give comments on the evidence against him. (Note 121) The ECtHR, however, stated that, because the counsel of the defendant had not been given the opportunity to pose questions to the witness a violation of Article 6(3)(d) ECHR had taken place. (Note 122) Another heavy-weighing factor was, in the Court's opinion, the fact that the testimony by the child constituted for the only direct evidence for the alleged sexual abuse by the defendant. (Note 123)
In Bykov v. Russia (Note 124), however, the ECtHR stated that unsupported evidence does not necessarily pose a threat to fairness: 'it may be noted that were the evidence is very strong and there is no risk of its being unreliable, the need for supporting evidence is correspondingly weaker.' (Note 125) This quote confirms that the Court counterbalances all factors in a specific case to determine whether a violation of the right to fair trial has taken place.
Sole or Decisive Rule
The evidence in sexual abuse cases involving children is often limited and, in some occasions, the victim's testimony is the only significant evidence. separately, but as they both dealt with whether the absence of a witness was satisfactorily counterbalanced and as they were both directed at the United Kingdom, they were dealt with jointly.
Mr Al-Khawaja was a British consultant physician who was accused by one of his patients, ST, of sexually assaulting her while she was under hypnosis. The accusation was brought a few months after the event had taken place. Another woman, VU, also reported that Mr Al-Khawaja had sexually assaulted her. Before the trial could take place, however, ST committed suicide, which left het unable to testify in court. The judge, as a result, decided to read her statement, which was recorded by the police, to the jury, but instructed to accord less weight to it as it was not possible to cross-examine the witness. Two of ST's friends, who she had confessed to after the event, and ST's general practitioner, who had written a letter to a hospital in which he described the allegation against Mr Al-Khawaja, were questioned in court. Mr Al-Khawaja was subsequently convicted and, also, the Court of Appeals did not establish a violation of the right to fair trial under Article 6 ECHR. (Note 128) The ECtHR stated that, while the evidence by ST was decisive (Note 129), there had been sufficient counterbalancing factors to find no violation of the right to fair trial. (Note 130) In particular, it emphasised on the fact that 1) ST was unable to testify in court, 2) ST had told her friends of the event in question right after it had happened 3) ST's statement was properly recorded and could thus be assessed by the court, 4) there were only minor discrepancies between ST's statement and the accounts given by her two friends, and, most importantly, 5) ST's statement showed strong similarities with that of VU, with whom there was no proof of collusion. (Note 131)
Mr Tahery had gotten into a fight with another man, S, who, during the fight, was stabbed in the back with a knife. S could not say with certainty who stabbed him, but a witness, T, told the police that he had seen Mr Tahery doing so. Out of fear of retribution, T refused to testify in court, which the presiding judge found reasonable. After instructing the jury to give less weight to T's statement due to his absence, the judge allowed the statement as evidence. Resultantly, Mr Tahery was convicted without having the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The first question this model poses is whether it is necessary to admit the witness statement. This question can also be rephrased to whether there is a good reason for the non-attendance of a witness whose statement is used as evidence. The Court phrases this as follows:
'The requirement that there be a good reason for admitting the evidence of an absent witness is a preliminary question which must be examined before any consideration is given as to whether that evidence was sole or decisive. Even where the evidence of an absent witness has not been sole or decisive, the Court has still found a violation of Article 6 § § 1 and 3(d) when no good reason has been shown for the failure to have the witness examined.' (Note 138) Secondly, it must be assessed whether the evidence that was not tested for reliability was the sole or decisive basis for conviction. As could be noticed from the way the ECtHR dealt with the evidence in Tahery, stronger counterbalancing forces are necessary in case of sole or decisive evidence.
Thirdly, the model asks whether there were there sufficient counterbalancing factors, including strong procedural safeguards, to ensure that the trial, judged as a whole, was fair?
Conclusion
The last question in the Al-Khawaja & Tahery model clearly shows the development of the Court in dealing with the right to fair trial and witness participation of (child) victims. While previous ECtHR case law offered little clarity on its decision-making process in assessing whether a violation of the right to fair trial was caused by the absence of a witness, the current doctrine gives national courts more support in making this assessment themselves. The only question left is what factors tip the balance to the one side or the other. Here, the established case law can provide national courts with the weight of these factors.
An interesting observation is that the seemingly absolute right for child victims to participate in criminal proceedings through audio-recorded testimonies, as guaranteed by Article 24(1)(A) of the Directive, seems to be incompatible with the rights of suspects guaranteed under the ECHR and the Charter under most circumstances.
This incompatibility becomes problematic through the possible -and likely -direct effect of the Directive. This would create a situation in which a child victim may rely on the provisions in the Directive before a national court while the suspect can effectively call upon the right to fair trial before the ECtHR.
These findings raise the question of how EU Member States are supposed to implement the content of the Directive in national law without violating the right to fair trial, as guaranteed by both the ECHR and the EU Charter. The answer to this question can be found in ECHR case law, which contains the factors that can or cannot counterbalance a breach of the defendant's right to have witnesses examined in court. In implementing the Directive, Member States are thus advised to take all counterbalancing measures possible.
However, these implementation possibilities do not conceal the Directive's lack of regard of suspect rights. It offers a variety of rights to victims and even more to special victims, but it almost completely disregards one of the foundations of democracy: the right to fair trial. The EU Member States are obliged to implement the content of the Directive to national law by 16 November 2015. (Note 139) However, the European Commission could have made this process a lot easier by considering suspect rights as well. If the latter were the case, perhaps the summum ius it aims to guarantee would not lead to a possible summa iniuria.
